











Better than average: 





Glen Dowie (DWXGLE001) 
 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of the University of 
Cape Town Senate in fulfilment of part of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Commerce specialising in Finance (in the field of 
Financial Management) in approved courses and a minor dissertation. 
The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the 
completion of a programme of courses. 
 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations 
governing the submission of Master of Commerce dissertations, 
including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the 




Supervisor: Gizelle Willows 
 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












This dissertation examines overconfidence in an investing environment to determine if there is evidence 
of the phenomenon amongst a sample of academics at participating universities. 
A survey was sent out to over 6 000 staff members at four South African universities assessing 
respondents’ ability to estimate their return earned in unit trusts in which they were invested, as well as 
assessing whether they would adjust their estimate when presented with an anchor (the relevant JSE All 
Share Index return). 466 completed responses were obtained, of which 81 respondents indicated that 
they were invested directly in a South African equity unit trust to allow for statistical testing. The data 
obtained were analysed for evidence of overconfidence and anchoring by comparing respondents’ 
estimates of fund returns against historical returns and then checking whether they adjusted their 
estimate after being presented with an anchor.  
It was found that investors were under-confident rather than overconfident with women giving lower, 
and thus more under-confident estimates than their male counterparts. Furthermore, it was found that 
older respondents were better able to estimate their past returns than younger respondents. The 
presence of an anchor appeared to have no effect on respondents’ estimates.
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Overconfidence has the ability to affect investment decisions through incorrect thought processes and 
incorrect belief in one’s own abilities. Previous studies (notably Glaser and Weber (2007)) have set out 
how overconfidence affects an individual’s abilities to estimate their past equity returns. The purpose of 
this dissertation is to determine whether or not overconfidence, and other behavioural biases, affect 
investors abilities to estimate their historic returns.  
Relevant literature will be reviewed in chapter 2, starting with an understanding of behavioural biases. 
This field will then be further investigated to determine which behavioural biases have the most important 
instances of effect on an individual’s abilities to estimate historic equity returns and how these biases 
affect thought processes.  
The findings from the literature review will inform the research questions which will be stated in chapter 
3. The research questions have the objective of determining whether overconfidence is prevalent among 
investors surveyed. The research approach will be discussed with an explanation of the data sourced for 
the investigations. The methods applied to the data will also be explained.  
In chapter 4, the results of the application of the methods to the data will be presented. These will be 
described and discussed in detail. Where possible, relevant literature will be referenced in order to offer 
explanations for any notable findings. Any particular observations that merit additional investigation will 
be further analysed and the results thereof discussed.  
Chapter 5 will set out the resultant conclusions based on the results of chapter 4 and the literature 
reviewed in chapter 2. Areas offering scope for further study will also be set out.  
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Literature Review1  
“Over their lifetime, people base thousands of decisions on impressions of their skill, knowledge, 
expertise, talent, personality, and moral character” (Dunning et al., 2004). If these decisions are based on 
incorrect impressions of our skill, knowledge, expertise and talent we may end up making the wrong 
decisions, not as a result of our poor decision-making ability, but rather because of the behavioural biases 
that affect our impressions of how much we think we know.  
Traditional finance models are based on utility theory as well as arbitrage assumptions that form the basis 
of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Ritter, 2003). Behavioural biases are those factors that 
traditional models are unable to explain when looking at market returns and reactions. Ritter (2003) 
points out that there are errors in the ways that people think, act and process information and these 
errors are what lead to the traditional models being unable to explain certain market events. Behavioural 
finance uses models where some participants are not fully rational, either because of the beliefs that they 
hold or due to preferences. In contrast to the EMH, which assumes that markets will form an unbiased 
view of the future, behavioural finance assumes that markets are sometimes not information efficient.  
Certain cognitive biases have been identified, such as heuristics (Ritter, 2003), overconfidence (Barber & 
Odean, 2001), mental accounting (Shefrin & Statman, 1984) , framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), 
representativeness (Kahneman et al., 1982), conservatism (Greenwood & Nagel, 2009), and the 
disposition effect (Ritter, 2003) which all lead to investors behaving irrationally (Ritter, 2003). There is 
another limitation to traditional models, as identified by Ritter (2009), namely limits to arbitrage 
opportunities. Firstly, if the events that allow arbitrage are once-off it is very difficult to make money off 
the trades owing to their unpredictability. If the events are recurring, then other market participants step 
in to take advantage of these opportunities and erode the advantage away (Ritter, 2010). Thus to continue 
making profits off these opportunities, the investor needs to become more and more leveraged which, as 
was proved by Long Term Capital Management (Jorion, 2000), is not sustainable. All these factors have 
contributed to behavioural finance becoming a more widely researched area. 
Research from numerous corners of psychological inquiry (Wegerif et al., 1999; Williams & Gilovich, 2008; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Plous, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) suggests that self-assessments of skill and 
character are often flawed. These flaws can be substantive (those biases that are independent of us) and 
1 Extracts from this chapter have been compiled as a conference paper as yet unpublished at date of submission. 
These extracts have not been separately identified throughout the chapter. 
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systematic (the process that we follow to make our decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001; Dunning et al., 
2004)). The results show that, in general, peoples’ self-views hold only a tenuous to modest relationship 
with their actual behaviour and performance (Dunning et al., 2004). The correlation between how people 
rate their own skill and actual performance in many aspects is “moderate to meagre” (Dunning et al., 
2004). Epley and Dunning (2000) found that at times, other people’s predictions of the participant’s skill 
were more accurate than the participant’s own prediction. In addition to incorrect self-rating, people 
overrate themselves relative to their skill and performance level. The average person believes that they 
have an ‘above average’ level of skill and performance which defies simple mathematical probability as 
only half of a population can have an above average level of skill (College Board, 1977). Furthermore, 
people “over-estimate the likelihood that they will engage in desirable behaviours and achieve favourable 
outcomes, furnish overly optimistic estimates of when they will complete future projects, and reach 
judgments with too much confidence” (Dunning et al., 2004). Epley and Dunning (2006) found that people 
fall prey to biases that leave their self-assessments flawed in systematic ways, from the start of their 
thought process to their final decisions, which carry significant implications such as wrong decisions and 
incorrect views of themselves. 
There are several psychological processes, as mentioned above as cognitive biases, at play, that produce 
these vastly flawed self-assessments. A quote from Benjamin Franklin highlights the fact that it has always 
been notoriously difficult to produce unbiased self-assessments: “There are three things extremely hard: 
steel, a diamond, and to know one's self” (Franklin, 1750). 
This literature review will set about looking at the behavioural biases that affect the decisions and 
estimates’ made of an individual’s self-performance. These are most notably: overconfidence (Barber & 
Odean, 2001), anchoring (Switzer III & Sniezek, 1991), representativeness (Kahneman et al., 1982), 
conservatism (Switzer III & Sniezek, 1991), the ‘better than average’ effort (Landier & Thesmar, 2008), 
information deficits and lack of feedback and socialisation (Dunning et al., 2004), as identified by existing 
literature. Each bias will be individually investigated to gain a better understanding as to how it affects an 
individual’s views of their own performance and an individual’s prediction of their performance going 
forward. 
Overconfidence  
Overconfidence influences an investors propensity to trade frequently yet unsuccessfully (Bailey et al., 
2011), which is largely due to the fact that they overrate their knowledge and abilities and are overly 
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optimistic about future prospects (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977; Tourani-Rad & Kirkby, 2005, 
Fischhoff et al., 1977). In a study by Alpert and Raiffa (1982) it was found that the confidence intervals 
that individuals assign to situations are far too narrow; their 98% confidence interval included the true 
quantity only 60% of the time. Additionally, people are poorly calibrated when it comes to estimating the 
probability of an event occurring. In a study by Fischhoff et al. (1977), events that individuals thought were 
certain only happened about 80% of the time and events that individuals deemed impossible occurred 
20% of the time. 
Individuals see events and issues through the view of their political ideology, individual and group history 
and interests as well as their own desire to see themselves in a positive light (Lin, Pronin & Ross, 2002). 
Individuals fail to see that their own ‘objective views’ of events that they are not involved in are not 
completely objective because of the fact that they are looking at circumstances through the lens of their 
own unique past experiences (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002). However, individuals feel that because of their 
own past experiences they are better suited to the situation as they have more insight as opposed to 
having more biases (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002). Lin et al. (2002) argue that many individuals agree with the 
psychological findings relating to these biases, however, what individuals fail to see is how these biases 
play a role in their own judgements and inferences. This asymmetry in perceptions has been termed 
“naive realism” (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Pronin, Puccio & Ross, 2002; Ross & Ward, 1995) and states that 
individuals assume that their own take on the world is authentic without giving it much thought. When 
others do not take the same view on the issue, individuals search for an explanatory reason and the most 
often arrived at explanation is that others’ views are subject to some bias and this stops them from 
reacting as the situation demands (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002). In using the explanation that others’ biases 
are the reason for the difference in views in the situation, individuals fail to recognise their own 
perceptions and reactions as being biased (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002). This leads individuals to have more 
faith in their own insights and to be overconfident about them. Even after having read descriptions of 
biases that subjects had displayed during an interview, the individuals denied that their self-assessments 
were subject to these biases but confirmed that others displayed these biases (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002).  
Odean (1999) looked at the overconfidence of traders and found that traders who trade most frequently 
are often the worst performers. The average net return of traders who trade frequently was 7.1% lower 
than the return made by investors who traded infrequently (Barber & Odean, 2000). Furthermore, 
overconfident investors tend to hold undiversified portfolios indicating that a lack of diversification was 
an investor choice and not as a consequence of institutional factors such as trading costs (Odean, 1998; 
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Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Odean (1998) further showed that this lack of diversification was owing to an 
investors unjustified belief in that stock, which meant that the investor held more of the stock than a 
rational investor would have. 
Male investors have been found to exhibit overconfidence (Bailey et al., 2011) to a greater extent than 
females (Barber & Odean, 2001) and inexperienced investors have been found to be more prone to 
optimism (Greenwood & Nagel, 2009). Furthermore, self-assessments of skill and character tend to be 
more inaccurate than people suspect leading to overconfidence (Dunning et al., 2004). Dunning et al. 
(2004) found that most people only have a modest level of insight into the skills that they possess and 
character traits that they have. All these factors contribute to the incorrect view that individuals hold of 
themselves. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) point out that overconfidence about private signals 
(information that is not commonly known to the market and has been found from a private source) can 
cause an overreaction to information; whilst self-attribution (attributing success to competence and 
failures to bad luck) maintains overconfidence in individuals. This maintained overconfidence allows 
prices (of stocks) to continue to overreact to information in the market place. These private signals and 
self-attribution biases will lead investors to overestimate their returns and continue to do so until those 
private signals are refuted. Daniel et al. (1998) found that wealthier investors suffer less from this self-
attribution bias than their less well-off counterparts. 
Dunning et al. (2004) further found that people place too much confidence in the insightfulness of their 
judgements. They overestimate the likelihood that their judgements of the present are correct and that 
their predictions about the future will prove true. Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) found that 
college students who took a general knowledge quiz overestimated the probability that their own answers 
were correct. This phenomenon was observed again three years later when Cambridge and Shreckengost 
(1978) conducted research at the Central Intelligence Agency which showed that the analysts at the CIA 
overestimated the accuracy of their own predictions about future world events. 
Dunning et al. (2004) proposed that the reason for this overestimation of relative performance is that 
people often lack the critical information that they need to make fair comparisons with others. Dunning 
et al. (2004) also found that there is information available to help in their comparison, but that this 
valuable information is either ignored or not sought out. In studies done by Festinger (1954) and Suls, 
Martin, Wheeler, Suis and Martin (2002) it was found that people prefer to know how they compare 
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against their peers, rather than against objective standards, as comparisons to peers affect people’s 
behaviour more (Klein, 1997). By comparing themselves to peers, individuals modify their behaviour and 
actions more readily than they do if they simply compare themselves against an objective standard.  
When looking at future events to determine what the expected outcome will be, people tend to follow a 
“natural and simple psychological strategy” (Dunning et al., 2004). They will consider some future event, 
scenario or action and determine as many scenarios as possible that could produce the desired outcome. 
When these scenarios seem plausible, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that people tend to be 
overconfident about the likelihood of the outcomes taking place. People tend to make overly optimistic, 
and sometimes overly pessimistic, predictions about the future because they fail to consider the fact that 
they are unaware of all the details of the future and that the outcomes are often unpredictable (Read & 
Van Leeuwen, 1998). Situational features are difficult to predict in other ways because people struggle to 
determine how they will react under certain circumstances. The situations that people tend to struggle 
with most are those that have “significant emotional or visceral components” (Read & Van Leeuwen, 
1998). These components often result in people being overly optimistic about predictions or sometimes 
pessimistic for the same reasons. In Read and Van Leeuwen's 1998 study, they asked office workers who 
had just eaten a substantial lunch to predict what snack they would want delivered to them at 4 PM in a 
week’s time. Most people said that they would prefer to have a healthy snack (such as an apple) delivered 
rather than a more filling snack (such as a candy bar) even though they intellectually knew that they tend 
to be hungry at that time of the afternoon. A week later, when both snacks were delivered, more of the 
workers chose the unhealthy candy bar over the healthy snack that they had predicted they would choose, 
showing that the workers were unable to judge their own needs and were influenced by immediate 
circumstances rather than previous insights. It could thus be expected that even with prior consideration, 
an individual could change their estimate given their current circumstances and frame of mind. 
Other causal factors have also been found to contribute to overly optimistic predictions. People tend to 
neglect important information that they have on hand when making predictions (Read & Van Leeuwen, 
1998) owing to their behavioural biases. When people predict how they think they will behave or react in 
certain circumstances; they tend to dwell on the positives of the scenario and fail to consider the worst-
case scenarios that could easily be generated (Newby-Clark et al., 2000). Another causal factor is that 
people often neglect their own past experience when making decisions, which is often the most relevant 
information (Dunning et al., 2004).  
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In a workplace-specific study done by Dunning et al. (2004) it was found that the overly optimistic views 
held by individuals of their perceived abilities and promotional opportunities are only modestly related to 
their actual abilities and promotional opportunities. With this in mind, Dunning et al. (2004) points out 
that these biases affect performance evaluation. Furthermore, it is shown that what organisations fail to 
recognise is that routines and procedures can be adopted to keep these biased self-views from affecting 
performance in many situations and that these procedures and routines could be used by individuals to 
produce more accurate self-assessments (Dunning et al., 2004). More accurate self-assessments would 
help investors to be aware of behavioural biases and this would be witnessed by more accurate estimates 
of self-performance (Dunning et al., 2004). 
The engineering profession has developed a method to guard against overconfidence as safety is such an 
important aspect to their profession. When engineers calculate how much concrete is required to build a 
dam wall, or how much material will be needed to build an aeroplane wing, any miscalculation on the 
underside can have a serious effect on public safety. Therefore the profession has built in a mechanism 
whereby they incorporate ‘safety factors’ (Heath, Larrick & Klayman, 1998). Once the amount of concrete 
or material has been calculated, they are required to multiply this amount by a factor of between  
3 and 8, effectively tripling, or more, the required amount of concrete and material. Thus, even though 
engineers suffer from overconfidence like all individuals, they have developed a strategy that helps to rule 
out the incorrect judgements made by this bias (Heath, Larrick & Klayman, 1998).  
Thus far the focus has been on the negative aspects of overconfidence, but Landier & Thesmar (2008) 
found that it does have some positive effects. Landier & Thesmar (2008) showed that during the early 
stages of their businesses, overconfident entrepreneurs worked harder to find customers and research 
technology in comparison to those who were not overconfident. However, on the negative side of 
overconfidence, entrepreneurs who were overconfident were more likely to ask friends and family for 
funds to start their business as opposed to obtaining a bank loan. When they did obtain a bank loan they 
tended to rely on short term financing to fund the business as opposed to borrowing long term which may 
have been more beneficial. This decision by the entrepreneur gave them better control of their finances 
in the short term but exposed them to a much greater risk in the long term. 
Another benefit of overconfidence is that in the most severe and stressful of psychological circumstances, 
those people who exhibited overconfidence recover better (Taylor, Lichtman & Wood, 1984). Women 
facing a life-threatening disease, such as breast cancer, show the most psychological adjustment when 
they display unnatural levels of optimism (Taylor et al., 1984). Similarly, civil war veterans or people 
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struggling with the loss of a loved one tend to recover better when they overrate themselves (Bonanno, 
Field, Kovacevic & Kaltman, 2002). However, in less extreme circumstances, as is more often the case 
(Landier & Thesmar, 2008), the evidence discussed above suggests that overconfidence is not helpful. 
Thus far the focus has also been on overconfidence as a single bias, however, Barberis and Thaler (2003) 
point out that overconfidence as a bias may stem from two other behavioural biases: self-attribution bias 
and hindsight bias. Self-attribution bias, is a person’s tendency to attribute any success that they may 
have to their own talent and good choice whilst ascribing any failure to bad luck rather than bad decisions 
and incompetence (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). When people do this repeatedly, they come to the incorrect 
conclusion that they are in fact very talented when this is often not the case (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
Gervais and Odean (2001) point out that when an investor has a few successful quarters they may become 
overconfident in their own abilities. Hindsight bias happens when people believe that they predicted an 
event before it happened (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). If people begin to believe that they have been able 
to predict the past better than they actually did, then there is a strong possibility that they will start to 
think that they can predict the future better than they actually can (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). This will lead 
to greater self-attribution bias as well as a higher level of overconfidence (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
In a study by Ulrike Malmendier and Diversif (2005) it was found that CEOs of large US corporations were 
found to be under-diversified, which shown earlier is as a result of overconfidence (Baker & Nofsinger, 
2002). These CEOs were investing human capital into the business by working there as well as having a 
large part of their salary in the form of stock and stock options. Thus, even moderate risk aversion would 
predict that CEOs should diversify their portfolios (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Other CEOs additionally 
purchased stock in their own company at the same time as they were holding stock options. Ulrike 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) did not find any evidence that these CEOs earned abnormal returns on their 
portfolios by holding shares in their own company. A possible conclusion to reach from this is that CEOs 
have an overconfident view of themselves and the effect that they will have on their company’s share 
price and thus hold an undiversified portfolio in the belief that they will outperform the market. 
In conclusion, investors are overconfident, men more so than their female counterparts. This 
overconfidence will lead an investor to overestimate the returns that they have generated. Furthermore, 
they will trade more than the rational investor would, translating into a lower return earned. This 
overconfidence can come from various biases such as self-attribution and hindsight bias, although there 
is evidence to suggest that the wealthier an investors becomes, the less prone they are to self-attribution. 
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Furthermore, self-ratings and reviews are not very accurate, which enables the manifestation of 
overconfidence.  
Anchoring 
Anchoring is the bias that people exhibit when they form a decision, base a statement or make an estimate 
based on some initial, possibly arbitrary, value (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In 
other words, people anchor a decision based on an initial base. Judgements made where the anchoring 
bias is present occur when individuals use some available quantitative information as a starting point, 
known as “the anchor”, and then adjust the anchor up or down to arrive at a judgement (Switzer III & 
Sniezek, 1991). 
Anchoring has been described as one of the original three decision making heuristics (Kahneman et al., 
1982) and its effects have been documented in such wide areas as real estate valuation (Northcraft & 
Neale, 1987), effort and task motivation (Switzer III & Sniezek, 1991) as well as consumer purchasing 
decisions (Wansink et al., 1998). Research by Northcraft and Neale (1987) among others (Englich et al., 
2006) has shown that even experts are subject to anchoring bias. Anchoring is a central part of 
explanations for a number of diverse events (Wilson et al., 1996) ranging from why people make 
conservative judgements of probability (Edwards, 1968; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971), believe that events 
that occurred in the past were inevitable (Fischhoff, 1975), and believe false information (Gilbert, 1991). 
Switzer III and Sniezek (1991) showed that treating the anchoring and adjusting bias as a general-purpose 
contingency-judgement mechanism leads to counterintuitive hypotheses. Switzer III and Sniezek (1991) 
pointed out that if anchoring and adjusting is a general-purpose contingency-judgement mechanism then 
the mere presence of random numbers could be used to manipulate performance. However, Switzer III 
and Sniezek (1991) went on the show that the presence of random numbers only has the above effect 
where judgment in task performance is required and not in all tasks as the person performing the task 
needs to pay sufficient attention to the anchor (Wilson et al., 1996). 
There are a number of theories as to how individuals integrate the initial arbitrary number into their 
judgement, known as the integration adjustment processes (Wilson et al., 1996). Lopes (1985) stated the 
initial numbers may be averaged, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) stated there may be insufficient 
adjustment and Quattrone, Lawrence, Finkel and Andrus (1984) stated there may be an adjustment until 
people are just within the range of plausible values. Wilson et al., (1996) referred to this as the integration 
and adjustment process.Kaustia, Alho and Puttonen (2008) performed controlled tests on 300 
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Scandinavian financial advisers where the advisers were asked about their stock market expectations 
while the information provided to them was changed. The study looked at the effect that historical data 
had on forming expected returns.  In the first experiment (Kaustia et al., 2008) advisors were provided 
with the real average return of European stocks over the last century of 4.5%. The average expectation of 
the stock market return over the next 20 years was projected to be 4.6%. In comparison to this, when 
advisors weren’t presented with the historical return they estimated that returns over the next 20 years 
would be 3.4% higher than those who had been given the historical return. When advisors were asked 
whether their knowledge of past returns had affected their estimate of future returns, those that said 
they hadn’t had the same strong grouping around the 4.5% historical return as those advisors who said 
that the historical return had a strong influence on their estimate (Kaustia et al., 2008).  
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1974) suggest that the anchoring effect is an unconscious cognitive 
process. The individual may feel that their estimate is not influenced by an anchor, but in reality they are 
(Wilson et al., 1996). 
In an experiment by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), individuals were asked to estimate the percentage of 
countries belonging to the united nations that were African. To test the anchoring bias, they asked the 
subjects if their number was higher or lower than a randomly generated number between 0 and 100. 
Those subjects given the number 10 subsequently had an average estimate of 25% while those given the 
number 60 subsequently had an average estimate of 45%. This showed that if subjects have an initial 
number to base their estimates off, that it would affect their estimate.  
The above literature points towards a bias that affects the way in which people make estimates or 
assumptions about given scenarios. These situations can be areas where individuals are experienced or 
completely new to the subject (Kaustia et al., 2008). Anchoring has the potential to affect every decision 
that an individual makes, however, Kaustia et al. (2008) found that experience significantly reduces 
behavioural biases when comparing test results from students to those of experienced professionals. 
Kaustia et al. (2008) showed that anchors can play a significant role in individual’s estimation of their past 
returns. 
Representativeness and Conservatism 
The representativeness heuristic occurs when people try to evaluate the probability of A being true based 
on the closeness that A resembles B and the probability that B is true (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Representativeness is a helpful heuristic most of the time (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) as many 
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judgements that we make every day are done so based on our past experiences. The following example 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) however, shows that this is not always the case: 
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she 
was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.” 
When subjects were asked which of “Linda is a bank teller” (statement A) and “Linda is a bank teller and 
is active in the feminist movement” (statement B) is more likely, subjects’ assigned greater probability to 
B. Representativeness provides a simple explanation for this. The description of Linda sounds like the 
description of a feminist – it is representative of a feminist – leading subjects to pick B.” 
If investors have had some recent information from the stock market or recent feedback regarding 
performance then it is possible that they can take this feedback and construe that because they perhaps 
performed well in the last period that they have always performed well (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Additionally, when they know of a few shares that are doing well, they could be led to the conclusion that 
because those shares are doing well that all of their shares must be doing well and hence they must have 
received a good return on their investment as a whole, which is not a representative judgement to make 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Another bias that representativeness generates is sample size neglect (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). When 
people look at a sample size and draw conclusions off that sample they neglect the fact that bigger sample 
sizes are more reliable and robust than smaller sample sizes. If a coin is tossed four times and on two 
occasions, the result is heads and the other two, the result is tails; it will be representative of a coin toss 
of 10 000 where there were 5 000 heads and 5 000 tails. However, people find that the two sets of tosses 
are equally informative when in fact, the second set of tosses is much more so (Barberis & Thaler, 2003).  
Sample size neglect has the effect of people inferring results from a sample size where they do not initially 
know the data-generating process. Thus, an analyst with four good stock picks could be promoted on 
grounds of good performance and talent when in actual fact the stock picks are not representative 
(Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 1985). This belief that a small sample will be representative of the larger 
population is known as the law of small numbers (Charness & Rabin, 2002). In instances where people do 
know the data-generation process they can fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy: if coin tosses produce five 
heads in a row, people would say that a tails is due as they believe that even a small sample should be 
representative of the population (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). This leads individuals to have more confidence 
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in their own projections than an objective individual would have, and they are thus more prone to 
overconfidence (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
When comparing the effect of representativeness compared to conservatism, representativeness leads 
to the underweighting of the base rate and conservatism leads to the over-emphasis of the base rate 
relative to the sample size (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). In an experiment run by Edwards (1968), different 
coloured balls were placed into two urns and subjects were asked to estimate the probability that a certain 
set of balls could have come from the first urn. Most of the subjects estimated a probability of around 0.7 
while the true probability was 0.97, thus the subjects had all been over emphasising the base rate of 0.5.  
It can thus be seen that, depending on whether individuals are prone to representativeness or 
conservatism, a different reliance would be placed on the base weighting of the benchmark for their 
portfolio. 
Better than Average Effect 
People tend to believe that they are better than average (Landier & Thesmar, 2008); a view which violates 
simple mathematical probability as not more than half of a group can be above average (Landier & 
Thesmar, 2008). In a study over one year (1976-1977) of more than one million high school seniors, 70% 
of the students believed that they had above average leadership skills and only 2% of the same sample 
believed that their leadership skills were below average. In the same study, students were asked to rate 
themselves relative to their peers with respect to how well they got along with others. Nearly all the 
respondents rated themselves as at least average, 60% of the students said that they were in the top 10%, 
and 25% of the students believed that they were in the top 1% (Dunning, 1999).  
This ‘better than average effect’ does not only apply to students: Rutter, Quine and Albery  (1998) found 
that most motor cyclists believed they were less likely than the average biker to be in an accident. 
Similarly, 94% of professors stated that they did above average work (Cross, 1977). In studies by  
Gigerenzer (2004) and Lin et al. (2002) it was found that along with people being overconfident about 
their abilities they were also overconfident about how accurately they were able to self-assess their 
abilities. Individuals stated that they were more likely than their peers to provide accurate self-
assessments. Wagenaart and Loftus (1988) found that lawyers overestimate their chances of winning 
cases that are about to go to court while Odean (1998) found that stock pickers think that the stocks that 
they pick are more likely to end up winners than those of the average investor.  
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Dunning et al. (2004) also raised the problem of how competence is defined and showed that the reason 
people have an incomplete knowledge of their skills and competence is that it is hard to define what it 
takes to succeed in certain domains (Ernst, 1969; Chase & Simon, 1973). The example used by Dunning et 
al. (2004) is that it is easy to define a successful math performance because there are right and wrong 
answers. However, there is no exact formula for composing the perfect symphony or writing the perfect 
novel, so how does one measure which one is better?  
Dunning, Perie and Story (1991) determined that people tend to take ill-defined character traits and define 
them to their own advantage. Therefore, a person who is skilled at math would consider math a skill more 
centrally related to intelligence than a person who is challenged by math. Consequently, people tend to 
believe that they are above average in respect of traits that are ill-defined but not in those traits that are 
more constrained (Dunning et al., 1989; Suls, Lemos, et al., 2002). Therefore, people tend to say that they 
are “more sophisticated, idealistic, and disciplined than their peers” (Dunning et al., 1989), all of which 
are ambiguous traits, but individuals are not likely to think they are any more “neat, athletic, and 
punctual” as these traits are more constrained in their meaning (Dunning et al., 1989). Hayes and Dunning 
(1997) found that college students rated themselves more highly than their roommates on ill-defined 
positive traits but as soon as those traits were well-defined the ratings began to agree with those of others 
(Hayes & Dunning, 1997; Story, 2003). 
Given the fact that people prefer to find out how they are doing in comparison to others, it is noted that 
both Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger and Kruger (2003) and Weinstein (1982) found that people’s 
comparative judgements involved very little comparisons. Dunning et al. (2004) found that when people 
evaluate their skills relative to their peers (with respect to the same skills) they were egocentric and 
thought primarily of their own skills and attributes while ignoring those of others. Kruger and Dunning 
(1999) found that in asking a person to evaluate their skills relative to other people in a task that they 
could perform well (riding a bicycle for example) people say that they are better than average, forgetting 
that most other people can also ride a bicycle. When asked how they thought they compared to others in 
the skill of juggling most people thought that they were worse than average, once again, forgetting that 
most people cannot juggle and showing that we do not take into consideration the skill of our peers. 
These egocentric tendencies carry important implications for the base from which we prefer to compete 
with others. Windschitl, Kruger and Simms (2003) as well as Moore and Kim (2003) found that people 
would rather compete in areas that they are good at, forgetting that the people they are competing 
against are most likely good in the same area. College students preferred to take general knowledge 
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quizzes against their peers about movies involving Adam Sandler, an area they knew well, rather than in 
French painting, a difficult area, forgetting that what was easy or difficult for them was equally as easy or 
difficult for their competitors (Windschitl et al., 2003). This behaviour is irrational as performance should 
be relative to others rather than how good you think you are in isolation (Windschitl et al., 2003).  
This kind of egocentrism manifests itself in two areas: the first being the area of controllable traits, those 
traits that an individual has the ability to control either through practice or decisions (Windschitl et al., 
2003). Alicke, Vredenburg and Hiatt (2001) and Alicke (1985) found that people think of themselves as 
being superior in traits that they think are controllable but not in the area of non-controllable traits. 
Therefore, people think that they are more self-disciplined and co-operative than their peers (controllable 
traits) but that they are less superior when looking at creativity or other ‘uncontrollable’ traits. The second 
area is that of private traits and behaviours  (Alicke et al., 2001; Alicke 1985) which is when a trait 
manifests itself internally, such as self-consciousness or being picky. When traits are private we believe 
that we possess these traits in excess of our peers (Alicke et al., 2001; Alicke, 1985). The opposite of this 
belief is, however, not true. We tend to believe that we are less aggressive, verbose or poised than others 
as these are negative traits that manifest themselves internally (Miller & McFarland, 1987). This tendency 
to “neglect the internal lives of others” (Dunning et al., 2004) can result in a phenomenon known as 
pluralistic ignorance which is where people believe that they possess an opinion that is unique because 
of the fact that individuals believe that they possess more positive and less negative traits than others. In 
actual fact, however, most people in their community will share the same opinion (Dunning et al., 2004). 
In a study by Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) it was found that 81% of new business owners thought 
that they had a 70% chance or better of succeeding but only 39% of those owners thought that a business 
similar to theirs would succeed. This shows that that while people think that they are better than average, 
they also overestimate the likelihood of their own success. 
In summary, the literature shows that individuals not only believe that they are better than the average 
person, they also believe that they have more desirable personality traits and are more controlled and 
likeable than others. They tend to ignore the fact that most people struggle with the same problems and 
have the same vices, thereby misjudging how well or badly they will do. 
Information Deficits, Lack of Feedback and Socialisation 
There is literature that points out that certain people are inhibited by the double curse of incompetence: 
this happens when people do not possess the information or skills to make the correct decision in the first 
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place, and as a result of this are unable to realise just how poor their decision was (Dunning et al., 2004). 
In many intellectual domains, the skills that are required to make good decisions are often the same skills 
that are required to recognise good decisions, therefore lacking that skill will lead to double 
incompetence. In a study done by Kruger and Dunning (1999) it was shown that incompetent students, 
i.e. those performing badly relative to their peers, fail to recognize the deficiency of their performance. 
Additionally, in a study by Dunning et al. (2003) the bottom 25% performers in a college exam walked out 
thinking that they had outperformed their peers. If investors do not have the skills to make good 
investment decisions then it could result in them not knowing that they are making poor investment 
decisions. This could lead to a large gap between their actual returns and their self-assessment of what 
they think their return is. A quote from Pope and Butt (1969) sums this up well: “a little knowledge is a 
dangerous thing”. 
When individuals do not possess the knowledge to make decisions they fall prey to unknown errors of 
omission. This happens because anyone critiquing their own work will by default be unable to do so 
accurately as they do not possess the skills necessary to critique their work properly (Dunning et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, people receive incomplete feedback regarding their work and skills and this leads them to 
have artificially inflated views about the wisdom and accuracy of their actions (Dunning et al., 2004). 
Research into different domains has found that the correlation between performance and self-assessment 
of performance were stronger amongst certain groups of people. Dunning et al. (2004) found that in 
athletics where the feedback “tends to be constant, immediate, and objective” the correlation of objective 
feedback to self-perception of knowledge and objective performance was 0.47 compared to the average 
of the study at 0.29. Hansford and Hattie (1982) found that the correlation between people’s views of 
their intelligence and their performance on an academic and intelligence test was between 0.2 and 0.3. 
Chemers, Hu and Garcia (2001) found that the correlation between students’ ratings of their first year 
academic performance and the evaluation that their instructors gave them was 0.35. DePaulo et al. (2003) 
found that people’s ability to detect when others were lying correlated 0.4 with when they were actually 
lying. When it comes to complex social skills where feedback is irregular, the correlation can be even 
worse. Dunning et al. (2004) found a correlation of only 0.04 between managers’ perception of their 
competence and objective feedback. These findings in literature show that immediate and objective 
feedback has a positive correlation to self-perception and self-evaluation whilst more complex, social skills 
are more difficult to evaluate than other skills.  
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Individuals may find it difficult to determine how well they are performing in a more complicated 
environment where performance standards and the corporate environment are shifting, making it difficult 
to determine what good performance looks like (Ashford et al. 1989). Furthermore, individuals may also 
not want feedback. Feedback provides an opportunity for an individual to improve, but at the same time, 
could also negatively affect their self-esteem if they find that they are not performing in line with what is 
expected. Additionally, Ashford et al. (1989) points out that individuals might appear to be needy or 
insecure when asking for feedback. 
Feedback is an important mechanism to help individuals obtain a better understanding of themselves and 
their abilities (Kluger & Denisi, 1996). However, several problems could be encountered when providing 
employees with feedback. Firstly, feedback is often infrequent and given too late (Ashford et al., 1989). 
When there are large time delays between feedback sessions, the feedback given tends to carry more 
weight and extra importance. This then exacerbates further problems which are discussed below. 
Additionally, with a long lapse in time between events and their related feedback, the feedback loses its 
effectiveness as individuals performed the tasks a long time ago (Larson, 1989). Because people tend to 
be overconfident about their abilities, feedback is often found to be threatening. If individuals perceive 
feedback as negative they are less likely to react to it in the correct manner (Kluger & Denisi, 1996). 
Feedback will often be interpreted as ‘I have been a bad manager and I will thus lose my bonus this year,’ 
as opposed to ‘they are trying to help me produce more products per week’ (DeNisi & Kluger, 2000; Kluger 
& Denisi, 1996).  
Socialisation is another factor that affects individual’s stock choices and trading decisions. Baker and 
Nofsinge (2002) concluded that socialisation among investors magnifies certain behavioural biases, 
notably overconfidence and the familiarity effect, where investors will invest in stocks that they are 
familiar with or know about. Research (Difonzo et al., 1998; Hirshleifer, 2001; Campbell & Shiller, 2001; 
Asch, 1956) has indicated that there are certain “herding” mentalities amongst investors that make them 
ignore their own private signals and rather listen to what others in the market are doing. This is believed 
to be one of the reasons for co-movement, where there is a movement in all stock prices even if there are 
no common factors, owing to a change in investor sentiment in a market. One such example was the 
massive internet stock bubble effect in the late nineties where all information technology stocks where 
vastly overpriced owing to investor sentiment surrounding the industry. As soon as this sentiment 
changed, stock prices crashed. Difonzo et al. (1998) showed that trading rumours, even those from non-
credible sources, affect trading decisions. Langevoort (2001) believes that, because of this herding 
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mentality, social interaction among investors is an underexploited aspect of investing and further research 
into this phenomenon could be done. 
While knowledge and skills are an important aspect of performing any task, those individuals that do not 
have the ability to perform the task competently in the first place are put in an even more difficult place 
as their lack of skills also means that they don’t ever realise how poorly they are performing the task 
either. Feedback is one solution to this problem but this mechanism has its own biases and pitfalls, as 
individuals struggle to take feedback positively or use the full benefit that feedback can provide to 
developing their own performance. Individuals are prone to believing those people that they socialise 
with more than their own information and this leads individuals to make poor decisions, including 
investment decisions. Not only are individuals making poor investment decisions because of this 
socialisation effect, they also struggle to estimate returns accurately which will be discussed below. 
Estimating Returns 
Investors that are prone to behavioural biases generally make poor decisions about fund style and 
expenses, trade frequently and have poor performance (Bailey et al. 2011; Barber & Odean 2001; Gervais 
& Odean 2001). Two major research areas of behavioural biases are the disposition effect and narrow 
framing (Bailey et al. 2011). Bailey et al. (2011) defines the disposition effect as “the propensity of an 
investor to sell winners too early and hold losers too long.” Bailey et al. (2011) along with other research 
(Shefrin & Statman 1984; Odean 1997) found that investors sell a greater proportion of winners and a 
relatively smaller proportion of losers . Narrow framing is the propensity of an investor to select 
investments individually, instead of considering the broad impact on their portfolio and thus not being 
aware of the effect on overall portfolio performance (Bailey et al., 2011). 
Bailey et al. (2011) found that there were positive correlations between the disposition effect, narrow 
framing, and in particular; lottery stocks preference, a preference for risky stocks. This shows an investor 
with substantial behavioural biases and in particular: a taste for risky stocks. Bailey et al. (2011) termed 
this type of investor as the Gambler. This type of investor also had negative correlations on age, income, 
investment experience and portfolio size which suggests that “the Gambler is relatively young, poor, 
unsophisticated, and inexperienced”. The negative correlation on stock portfolio diversification for this 
investor indicates a tendency for the Gambler to dive into single stocks rather than to spread their risk or 
invest in mutual funds.  
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Saunders (1993) investigated the NYSE returns and found that the exchange tends to earn positive returns 
on sunny days and mediocre returns on cloudy days. Goetzmann and Zhu (2002) are of the opinion that 
this is not because of individual investors trading patterns, but rather the mood of market makers. 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000) found that the outcome of major sport events’ as well as changes to 
daylight savings further affected the mood of market makers. These findings show that emotions can play 
a large part in investor decisions. Furthermore, if these emotions are affected by external sources, the 
estimate of returns by investors could be biased resulting in incorrect assessments. 
In a study by Amromin and Sharpe (2005) it was shown that the average investor believes the stock market 
will have persistent returns from year to year. From this, it was concluded that past returns could be 
extrapolated over the medium and long term to infer expected returns. This implies that, for the ordinary 
investor, when they expect the economy to be strong, the expected return relative to the amount of risk 
that is being taken on will be better than when the market is weak (Amromin & Sharpe 2005). Expected 
returns over the shorter term are more volatile than over the long term (Amromin & Sharpe 2005) which 
means that current market behaviour will affect estimates of past returns more in the short term than in 
the long term (Amromin & Sharpe, 2005; Ben-David et al., 2007). An interpretation of this finding is that 
expected returns vary with the business cycle (Amromin & Sharpe, 2005). When the economy is in a 
recession, returns are thought to be higher, and when times are good, the returns are thought to be lower 
(Amromin & Sharpe, 2005). 
Education, wealth, and other general financial market knowledge were the three factors that helped to 
increase an investors accuracy of the estimate of their past returns (Amromin & Sharpe, 2005). Therefore, 
as the respondent’s education level or the dollar value of their stock holdings increased, they had a much 
smaller recall error. However, when they controlled for age, Amromin and Sharpe (2005) found that the 
accuracy of their predicted returns were not significantly influenced by the number of years of investment 
experience.  
Fischhoff et al. (1977) believe that one aspect of risk is being unfamiliar with the stock that you are 
investing in, which results in a local and familiarity bias. Familiarity bias is the bias of an investor to invest 
in stock that they know of i.e. a stock that they are familiar with and whose operations they deal with 
often while a local bias is the reluctance to invest in anything that is not from the same region or country. 
These two biases are one of the reasons why investors are reluctant to diversify internationally despite 
the diversification advantages that this can hold. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) showed that this is largely 
due to local investors having an information advantage over their international counterparts. In a study 
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by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) respondents believed that the stock of their employer was safer 
than that of a diversified portfolio. Therefore, the evidence suggests that people view stocks that they are 
familiar with more favourably and believe that these stocks will deliver higher returns with a lower level 
of risk. Familiarity will shift portfolio weights towards local and familiar stocks, affecting the investors 
perceived risk and related return (Huberman, 2001). 
Individuals have been found to significantly overestimate historical returns (Kaustia et al., 2008). 
Goetzmann and Peles (1995) found that individual investors tend to overestimate the performance of 
their mutual funds by several percentage points and Kaustia et al., (2008) found that this was also true for 
general market returns.  
While estimating returns is not easy for a rational investor, it is made even more difficult by the biases 
that affect an individual’s decisions. Furthermore, an investors perceived opinion that they are better than 
others and more likely to succeed encourages them to trade more, often thinking that it will lead to better 
returns. 
Experienced Investors 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) define experience as the evolving behaviour of a single investor with regards 
to their investing decisions while Wilde (1900) stated that experience is the name we give to our mistakes. 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) determine experience by looking at the number of stock positions an investor 
has taken up until a particular date. Feng and Seasholes (2005) point out that experience, along with 
sophistication, minimise the disposition effect.  
Sophistication is defined as the number of “rights” i.e. ways that an investor is permitted to trade on their 
account, such as by use of the internet, telephone etc. Feng and Seasholes (2005) propose that more 
sophisticated investors are generally inclined to use more methods to trade. They apply for, and are 
generally granted, more rights at the time they open their accounts and are thus a more ‘sophisticated’ 
trader. Furthermore, Feng and Seasholes (2005) determine sophistication by the diversification level of a 
portfolio on its inception as well as the age of the investor.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) performed a comprehensive study of investment behaviour and showed 
strong evidence of the disposition effect among all major types of investors’ i.e. non-financial 
corporations, financial and insurance institutions, governmental organizations, non-profit institutions and 
households. This shows the presence of behavioural biases in all aspects of the financial markets.  
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By looking at different investment groups, i.e. retail investors vs. professional money investors, 
researchers have been trying to determine if there is evidence to support the disposition effect (Shefrin 
& Statman, 1984; Odean, 1998; Shapira & Venezia, 2001; Locke & Mann, 2005; Locke & Onayev, 2005; 
Feng & Seasholes, 2005). Feng and Seasholes (2005) found that sophisticated investors are 67% less likely 
than the average investor in their sample to exhibit symptoms of the disposition effect. Trading 
experience as a single factor can reduce the disposition effect in an individual by 72%, while a combination 
of trading experience and sophistication eliminates the reluctance in an investor to realise losses (Feng & 
Seasholes, 2005). On the other hand, Feng and Seasholes (2005) found that there is a large asymmetry 
between experience/sophistication and the disposition effect. Feng and Seasholes (2005) found that no 
amount of experience/sophistication could eliminate an investors propensity to realise gains. By looking 
at the effect that experience can have on this behavioural bias, it can be expected that as investors 
become more experienced, they are less prone to biased behaviour. As they are less prone to these biases, 
including overconfidence, experienced investors might be better placed to estimate their own returns 
more accurately. 
List (2003) investigated whether market experience eliminated the endowment effect: which implies that 
a good’s value increases once it becomes part of an individual’s endowment. List (2003) performed a study 
where the subject was endowed with good A and they had the option to trade it for good B. In a different 
treatment, a second subject is endowed with good B and they have the option to trade it with good A. As 
the subjects have been allocated to one of the two goods randomly, List (2003) hypothesises that “fewer 
than 50 percent of the subjects should swap their good if an endowment effect exists.” Or viewed slightly 
differently, if roughly 50 percent of the subjects do trade then this will indicate the non-existence of the 
endowment effect. List (2003) determined that the endowment effect was present and thus went on to 
test if experience eliminated this effect. 
List (2003) then obtained data from sports memorabilia auctions, specifically sports cards and collectable 
pins, which is a field where dealers gain experience from seeing different types of cards and pins with 
varying levels of rarity and quality. List (2003) looked at dealers, who have market experience and non-
dealers, who are predominantly inexperienced, to determine if there is a relationship between experience 
and the endowment effect. By giving participants one of two rare baseball cards of equal value, List (2003) 
proceeded to pull the other card out from under the table and ask the participant if they wanted to swop 
their card. After studying the results of the test List (2003) found that there was an endowment effect in 
the pooled data of the study which is consistent with other literature by Knetsch (1989), Kahneman et al. 
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(1990) and Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer and Sugden (1997). List (2003) also found evidence that 
suggested that market experience matters across all consumer types. List (2003) determined that there is 
an inverse relationship between market experience and the endowment effect. List (2003) then looked at 
those traders with a lot of trading experience, dealers and experienced non-traders, and determined that 
with this level of experience the endowment effect becomes negligible. List (2003) then returned to the 
same auction a year later and examined the same subjects and found that “market experience significantly 
attenuates the endowment effect.” List (2003) also found a link between gender and the endowment 
effect as women were found to trade less but stated that: “although gender and the endowment effect 
appear linked, future research is necessary before any firm conclusions can be reached concerning this 
relationship.” Feng and Seasholes (2005) comment that in comparison to the study done by List (2003), 
experience would not help to determine if one share certificate was more valuable than another share 
certificate of the same company as it would with baseball cards. Rather, experience should help an 
investor to resist the urges that could prompt them to make trades that lose money. 
In studies done by Kahneman et al. (1990), Kahneman et al. (1991) and Knetsch (1989) there is strong 
evidence in favour of the endowment effect. In Knetsch's (1989) study, 89 percent of those subjects 
originally endowed with a mug chose to keep the mug. Of the subject that were given a chocolate bar; 90 
percent of those subjects decided to keep the chocolate. The results from Kahneman et al. (1990) were 
as clear as Knetsch's (1989) study. Subjects were given Cornell University coffee mugs and allowed to 
trade them. If there was no endowment effect it was expected that 11 subjects would perform trades, 
however, over the four repetitions that were run only three trades were observed. This evidence further 
proves the existence of behavioural biases in subjects’ decision making. 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) showed that experience curves of both young and old investors as well as both 
genders are upward sloping for different types of traders, thus not confined to a specific market or type 
of trader. Furthermore, these upward sloping curves were noted for both high and low frequency 
investors. List (2003) found strong evidence that as an individual becomes more experienced, their 
behaviour converges towards an unbiased prediction. Because of this, it would be expected that as an 
investor becomes more experienced in the field of trading that there would be less bias in their decisions. 
Furthermore, this would imply that they would be able to more accurately predict what past returns have 
been as well as being able to display more realistic expectations of future returns.  
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) found that age is a reasonable proxy for experience. Vissing-Jorgensen and 
Attanasio (2003) show that young, inexperienced investors had the highest stock market return 
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expectations in the late 1990’s whilst Greenwood and Nagel (2009) found that inexperienced money 
managers (albeit having gone through training) displayed more significantly affected trading behaviour 
compared to experienced managers.  
A study by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) showed that inexperienced traders have adaptive 
expectations and Lahav, Noussair and Haruvy (2007) showed that investors extrapolate recent price 
movements when forming expectations. In validation of other research results (Feng & Seasholes, 2005; 
Kaustia & Knupfer, 2008; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Seru, Shumway, & Stoffman, 2009), Greenwood and 
Nagel's (2009) research indicates that prior experience influences investor behaviour.  
Seru et al. (2009) point out that there are two ways in which investors can gain experience; the first is 
learning through doing (Arrow, 1962; Grossman et al., 1977) and the second is to learn about their skills. 
Although these are the two main areas of learning they are not mutually exclusive and thus the 
importance of one cannot be looked at without taking the effect of the other into account (Seru et al., 
2010). As investors begin trading they discover that there is a large amount of information available to 
them and are unable to discern which is important and which is irrelevant (Seru et al., 2010). However, as 
they begin trading more and doing more research, they learn which of their sources they should place 
more reliance on. When an investor discovers that he or she has no reliable source of information or that 
they are unskilled in investing they will stop trading completely and chose rather to invest in a passive 
investment such as an index (Seru et al., 2010). Seru et al. (2009) found that 1 years’ worth of experience 
in the market is the same as an investor performing 100 trades. This could lead some investors to believe 
that excessive trading and incurring those initial trading costs is beneficial in the long run as they will be 
gaining valuable experience (Seru et al., 2010). 
Over a 30 day investment period Seru et al. (2009) found that an investor with one year of experience 
would earn 22 basis points more than an inexperienced counterpart. Additionally, Seru et al. (2009) found 
that as investors became more experienced, they increased their returns. This is achieved through 
experience or through realising that as an investor they are ill-equipped and would be better off investing 
in an index fund (Seru et al., 2010).  
Bailey et al. (2011) looked at behavioural biases to determine how they jointly relate to each other and 
measured their respective correlations. The major findings were that investors who timed their trades 
badly typically made decisions in isolation, bought speculative stock and ignored firm-specific information. 
All of the investors who timed trades badly also had the characteristics typical of an investor prone to the 
22 
 
disposition effect and narrow framing. These investors also exhibited a preference for buying lottery 
stocks (those with high risk and little chance of success) as well as being inattentive to earnings news from 
companies. Bailey et al. (2011) further found that age is positively correlated to investment experience 
and stock portfolio size. Investors who use short selling of shares or options are more likely to be 
experienced as well as financially sophisticated. These investors also have a greater diversification in their 
stock portfolios and minimise their tax through smart structuring of investments (Bailey et al., 2011). 
There were certain non-correlations that were discovered, such as: no association between investment 
experience and stock portfolio performance, i.e. the more experienced investors did not outperform their 
inexperienced counter parts, and there was also a negative correlation between stock portfolio 
diversification and stock portfolio performance (Bailey et al., 2011). It can thus be inferred that although 
experience has positive effects on certain behavioural biases, there are some behavioural biases for which 
experience is not the cure.  
The majority of the literature shows that experience will aid an investor in their decision-making as well 
as their ability to consider all necessary information. Owing to this it would be expected that the more 
experienced an investor is, the more accurate they will be in estimating past returns. 
Gender 
Gender differentials in investment behaviour have been researched by various authors (American, May, 
& Correl, 2001; Barber & Odean, 2001; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1981; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998). This 
research will draw on these research areas to determine if there is any difference in the accuracy with 
which men and women estimate past returns. 
Psychological research shows that men are more overconfident than women (Lundeberg et al., 1994), 
especially within the realm of finances (Prince, 1993). Deaux and Farris (1977) stated that men claim 
better overall ability than women do, but that this overconfidence is most prevalent in areas that are 
traditional masculine tasks. Deaux and Farris (1977) further prove that owing to the fact that 
overconfidence leads to over-trading, men are inclined to trade more than women. With the prevalence 
of share trading costs, men have subsequently been found to earn lower returns (Barber & Odean, 2001). 
Deaux (1977), Meehan and Overton (1986) and Beyer (1990) all found that in studies between genders; 
the effect of the self-attribution bias was greater for men than it was for women. It was concluded that 
men were thus more likely to become overconfident than women were.  
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Barber and Odean (2001) and Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum (1977) analysed survey responses and 
brokerage reports to determine if there was any evidence of overconfidence among investors. Both 
Barber and Odean (2001) and  Lewellen et al. (1977) found that men spend more time and money on 
analysing securities, rely less on the information and advice from their brokers, make more transactions, 
believe that stock returns are more predictable and anticipate higher returns than women do. In all these 
aspects, men were found to exhibit more overconfident characteristics than their female counterparts 
did. Barber and Odean (2001) found that both men and women expect to outperform the market with 
their own portfolio, this overconfidence was more extensive among men than their female counterparts. 
In addition to this, it was found that men held riskier positions in their common stock portfolios in 
comparison to women. This could ultimately result in a higher variability in returns earned by men (Barber 
& Odean, 2001).  
Correl (2001) performed research into the different types of jobs that men and women hold and 
determined that there was a significant difference between the genders ((Reskin, 1993; Jacobs, 1996; 
Jacobsen, 1994). Correl (2001) examined how gender differences in the perception of mathematical ability 
between college students influenced their career choices into mathematics, engineering and physical 
sciences. Correl (2001) found that as individuals move further and further down their study path, there 
are fewer females who choose quantitative career paths, in comparison with their male counterparts. This 
implies that fields such as law, medicine and engineering are more male-dominated. Catsambis (1995) 
and McIlwee and Robinson (1992) also found that the ratio of females to males declines as young people 
progress down the career path toward quantitative professions. Thus, only the most skilled and talented 
females will progress down these career paths and there could thus be a natural selection bias evident 
when analysing results from competency tests. Furthermore, those women who are confident enough to 
invest on their own behalf could have more knowledge and skill than their male counterparts owing to 
this natural selection. We could thus expect to see more accurate estimates of their past returns as they 
are more experienced. 
Conclusion 
There is a wealth of evidence strongly indicating that people make substantial errors when they evaluate 
their “abilities, attributes, and future behaviour” (Dunning et al., 2004). When people produce these 
incorrect self-assessments, there are several psychological mechanisms which can broadly be classified 
into two classes; those resulting from a lack of necessary information, and those where relevant and useful 
information at hand is ignored. Both result in an inaccurate assessment of the situation. In the first group, 
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individuals cannot take into account what they do not know and cannot accurately assess themselves (as 
they are unaware of how much they do not know). The second group is where all relevant information is 
available, but it is not used as a rational person should use it, resulting in an incomplete picture (Dunning 
et al., 2004). 
“People are often motivated to reach flattering conclusions about themselves and their place in the 
world” (Dunning et al., 2004). They will mould, manipulate, massage and manage all the feedback that 
they receive to make themselves feel like capable and loving people. Literature is full of examples of how 
these manipulations are done and examples of how individuals will try and construe as positive an image 
as possible while ignoring all negative aspects (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Dunning et al., 2003; Kunda, 
1990).  
For people to develop a better, less biased, picture of themselves they need to be aware of the biases at 
play as well as receiving feedback that is more accurate and timely. This feedback will help them to be 
more realistic about their own abilities and hence the returns that they estimate that they have had. 
Additionally, knowing that people are generally overconfident should convince people to have a ‘safety 
mechanism’ when estimating their own abilities and maybe reduce their self-view by a certain factor 
which will counteract the normal human nature (Heath et al., 1998). 
After reviewing behavioural biases that affect individuals it is apparent that there is no such thing as a 
rational investor and one could be expected to find the same irrationality in how investors estimate their 
returns. Overconfidence has a major effect on all individuals, but more so in men than in women. 
Furthermore, other major biases and heuristics, such as anchoring, representativeness and conservatism 
have been shown to affect investor behaviour and decisions. However, not only are individuals prone to 
these errors, but the less experienced they are, the more prone they are to these biases. With experience 
comes the ability to better read and understand one’s own ability and take feedback in a better light, 
which enables them to perform better. It was further noted that the more regular feedback is, the better 
an individual will respond thereto and hence, the more effective the feedback will be. Individuals also 
prefer to be compared to others rather than to objective standards as they are more prone to acting when 
they are compared to peers. At the same time though, when an individual thinks about the likelihood of 
success or being better than their peers, this comparison is forgotten as they only think about success and 
not success relative to their peers. Lastly, whilst important information is often available when making 
decisions and comparisons, individuals tend to ignore this information thinking that they are in fact better 





The literature has shown that individuals overestimate their returns and are overconfident. They are also 
prone to anchoring their decisions and fall prey to the representativeness bias, among others. In light of 
these findings; the following research questions were proposed:  
1. Do investors overestimate their returns? 
2. Does experience (with age as a proxy) influence the degree of overestimations? 
3. Are investors estimations influenced by anchors? 
In order to test these research questions null hypotheses have to be tested to determine if there is 
statistical evidence to support what literature has shown in other settings. The statistical significance level 
will be set at 95% as advised by the Statistical Sciences Department at the University of Cape Town. If the 
null hypothesis is accepted it will show that there is no difference between the actual and estimated 
returns earned by investors, that experience has no effect on the degree of overestimation and that 
estimates are not influenced by anchors. The implication if the null hypotheses are rejected, are that 
investors overestimate their returns, experience affects the degree of this overestimation and that 
estimations are affected by anchors. 
The focus of this study is thus to look at investors estimates of past returns and in particular their estimates 
of equity returns. The reason for only including equity funds will be explained in the research approach 
Research Approach 
This research is an attempt to replicate a study performed by Glaser and Weber (2007). Glaser and Weber 
(2007) obtained data from a German online broker for investors who had opened their accounts prior to 
1997 and had traded at least once during 1997. The data that Glaser and Weber (2007) analysed ranged 
from 1997 to 2001. Data available from the online broker included the investors age, gender, investment 
strategy and investment experience.  Glaser and Weber (2007) then sent out an online questionnaire 
asking those investors what they thought the return on their portfolio had been over the specified time 
period. 
Glaser and Weber (2007) calculated the return of each investor by looking at all the trades that had taken 
place on their accounts, and assumed that all trades took place at the end of the month. The results from 
the survey showed that the average estimate of returns was 15% per year and there was a range of 
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answers from -50% to +120%. The calculated correlation coefficient between estimated and actual returns 
was found to be -0.0471 with a p-value of 0.5203. Glaser and Weber (2007) found that this lack of 
correlation was consistent with a study performed by Owhoso and Weickgenannt (2007) and showed that 
there was no statistical relationship between estimates and actual returns. Glaser and Weber (2007) 
found that the relationship between actual and estimated returns was positive where estimated returns 
were statistically significantly higher than the realised returns. Glaser and Weber (2007) also found that 
experienced investors were better able to estimate their past returns and showed that investors with 
more than five years of trading experience were much better able to estimate their past returns than 
those with less than five years’ experience. The focus of this study is thus to look at investors estimates of 
past returns and in particular their estimates of equity returns. Age will be used as a proxy for experience 
as was documented by Greenwood and Nagel (2009) and Seru et al (2009). The results of the survey will 
also be analysed to determine if there is any evidence of anchoring, as was found to be the case by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
For this study, only pure equity funds will be looked at, as this is the closest replication that could be made 
of  Glaser and Weber (2007) who performed analysis on equity market data. The choice of funds was thus 
restricted to those funds classified as equity only per the PSG data obtained. PSG is an investment holding 
company that owns investments in many different industries including financial services, banking and 
private equity. PSG issue financial data on a daily basis and it was this data on unit trusts that was used to 
determine the funds to analyse. A sample of the funds selected from the PSG listings were tested against 
the data provided by the unit trust houses themselves for reliability and all those tested were found to be 
accurate. Furthermore, to take out any noise relating to foreign currency and foreign equity markets, any 
globally traded funds (funds with foreign equity holdings) were excluded from the sample to create scope 
for consistency in the analysis of returns and to be able to provide a relevant anchor (the JSE All Share 
Index) to respondents. The Pareto Principle (Sanders, 1992), which infers that 80% of the wealth could sit 
with 20% of the investors, was then applied to the unit trusts. The funds that comprised 80% of the total 
assets under management were determined by finding the smallest number of funds that comprise the 
required 80% of the wealth. The funds were ranked in size order, according to the closing value of funds 
under management on the 30th of June 2013. These funds were then ranked in size order, from most funds 
under management to least. By summing together the total value of all the funds it was determined that 
the 13 biggest funds represented slightly more than 80% of the total funds and these funds were thus 
selected to be included in the questionnaire.  For completeness, an ‘other’ row was inserted where 
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participants could list the name of a South African equity fund that was not one of the 13 listed funds 
provided. However, these funds were not analysed.  
Research Strategy 
Glaser and Weber (2007) sent out an online survey to obtain investors estimates of their past returns, 
thus in replicating this study an online survey was sent out whereby estimates of past returns, along with 
other information, were obtained. The University of Cape Town offers an online research tool called 
Qualtrics which was used to carry out the survey. Qualtrics is used in research surveys worldwide and has 
been approved by the University’s Commerce Faculty. The initial page of the survey explained to the 
respondent what the purpose of the survey was and asked if they wished to partake. Only if they clicked 
‘yes’ were they able to proceed to the next page of the survey where they were asked for certain 
demographic information (Appendix 1). Not all of the demographic information was used for testing 
purposes in this study, however, it was included to make the survey more thorough and complete. 
Respondents were asked for their rating of their own investment knowledge, their highest qualification 
and which faculty/industry they work in. Age was used as a proxy for investing experience to determine if 
experience diminishes the prevalence of the behavioural biases under investigation as was used by 
Greenwood and Nagel (2009) and Seru et al (2009). Respondents were also asked if they directly invest 
(i.e. not via a pension fund, retirement fund or provident fund) in a unit trust as being indirectly invested 
was seen as not being in charge of money allocations and thus not of relevance to this study.  
If the participant does invest in a unit trust he/she was asked if it is an equity only unit trust that they are 
directly invested in. If this is the case then a list of unit trusts would appear (as determined using the 
Pareto Principle explained in the research approach) with space to add up to three additional equity only 
unit trusts.  
Respondents were then asked to fill in the year that they started investing in each unit trust selected. This 
was done in order to determine over which periods returns could be garnered for each respondent, which 
later helped to analyse if their estimates of returns were applicable or not. As an example, if a respondent 
stated that they started investing 4 years ago but had estimates for five and ten year periods then these 
estimates would not be valid and excluded from analysis. 
Respondents were asked to estimate what annualised return they thought they have earned over the 
preceding 12 months, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years for the period ending 30th of June, where applicable, 
for each fund selected. Respondents were then presented with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All 
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Share Index returns (J203) for the preceding 12 months, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years for the same period 
ending 30th of June and asked, bearing the JSE returns in mind, to re-estimate the returns that they 
thought they had earned on their unit trusts over the same periods. The purpose of this was to test if 
anchoring was present and if so, to what extent the respondents would adjust their initial estimates when 
presented with the anchor. The JSE All Share return was selected as the anchor as it was the benchmark 
for most of the funds included in the analysis. 
The estimated returns for each fund were benchmarked against the annualised returns obtained from 
Bloomberg. Bloomberg is a New York based financial and news service founded in 1981. They are also 
used by UCT libraries as an approved data provider. The estimated returns were benchmarked for each 
applicable period to determine if there were any statistically significant results. The annualised returns 
given by Bloomberg were tested against fund fact sheets, obtained from each investment house’s website, 
to corroborate the results given to those presented by the funds. The fund fact sheets are the reported 
results presented by each fund, either quarterly or monthly, stating the biggest asset allocations and how 
the fund has performed compared to the fund benchmark (for the funds selected, the majority were 
benchmarked against the JSE All Share Index). One anomaly was noted, relating to the returns quoted by 
Investec. The fund fact sheets for the Investec Value Fund reported positive returns over the preceding 
12 months to 30th June but the Bloomberg data indicated a loss of 4.17%. It was decided to exclude this 
fund from the analysis due to this discrepancy. However, the fund was left in the questionnaire for 
completeness sake.  
The survey was cognitively tested by 10 people to evaluate the wording of the survey, its design and to 
help ensure the completeness of responses received from participants (Presser et al., 2004; Willimack et 
al., 2004). Of the people cognitively tested there were five males and five females and these individuals 
were spread across different faculties within the University of Cape Town as well as different jobs i.e. not 
employed by the University of Cape Town, and were of different ages. The suggestions from this testing 
were then analysed and, where appropriate, changes were made to update the original questionnaire. 
The updated survey can be found in Appendix 1. The changes made to the original survey were as follows: 
1. Changing the age from a manual input to a drop down list. 
2. The wording of certain questions were misinterpreted as the questions were either too long or 
not in bold/underlined and these questions were reworded and/or re-emphasised to draw 
attention to the important aspects. 
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3. The statement asking not to look at a fund fact sheet was removed from the question and made 
the subject of its own question to highlight this request to a greater extent. 
4. An explanation of what ‘equity’ is was inserted to remove any ambiguity or misunderstanding. 
5. Further demographic information was inserted asking about race, home language and marital 
status to improve potential qualitative assessment. 
6. An additional question was inserted asking if the participant has any children with the next 
question asking how old they are. 
7. The question asking for their children’s age was changed to state that the age should be in years. 
8. Options were added to reduce the variability of responses as to why participants were not directly 
invested in a unit trust in general or in an equity only unit trust, to ease the analysis of results. A 
multiple selection was made available with some of the common reasons given through the 
cognitive tests. An ‘other’ text box was also inserted to allow participants to fill in any other reason 
that they had for not investing in unit trusts in general or equity only unit trusts. 
9. Two additional questions were inserted with drop down lists for participants to select which 
faculty they work in and what their job position was. 
10. A clarification was made as to why an explanation was provided showing the difference between 
cumulative and annualised returns to avoid ambiguity. 
Research Method 
Owing to the low expected response rate, as indicated by the consultation services offered by the 
Statistics Department at the University of Cape Town, incremental sampling was used to obtain as many 
responses to the survey as possible, to improve the robustness of the results. The first sample were staff 
members, both academic and PASS (support) staff, at the University of Cape Town. The survey was sent 
out to 1 168 staff members at the University of Cape Town. The next sample included other Universities 
in the Western Cape, and thus the University of Stellenbosch, Cape Peninsula University of Technology 
and the University of the Western Cape were contacted. Only the University of Stellenbosch responded 
and granted permission for the survey to be sent.  The last step of the incremental sampling process was 
to include other universities in South Africa. From those contacted, the University of the North West 
(NWU) and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) agreed to partake in the study. No 
response was received from WITS University, the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Rhodes University, 
and the University of the Free State. The University of Johannesburg (UJ) denied access to their staff 
members and they thus did not form part of the sample. In total, over 6 000 participants were contacted 
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at the participating universities to request taking the survey. The total number of participants that 
completed the survey was 466. 
Of the 466 participant’s responses that were gathered, 81 participants stated that they were directly 
invested in equity only unit trusts. These responses were tabulated and reorganised to make comparison 
and statistical analysis easier. Certain respondents were invested in more than one unit trust and were 
invested for different periods of time. Thus some investors returned one data point (i.e. only gave one 
estimate and no adjusted estimates) while other investors were invested in five unit trusts and could 
supply up to forty data points (four estimates for all five unit trusts, 20 estimates, and an additional 4 
adjusted estimates for those unit trusts, another 20 estimates). In total there were 407 data points 
supplied by the 41 participants, (81 respondents less 40 that were excluded, explained below), that were 
analysed. In order to allow for testing of the data points which comprised a bigger sample, over the 
number of respondents (a smaller sample), the distribution of the data points required testing to ensure 
that there weren’t a small number of respondents making up a large number of data points. i.e. if a small 
number of respondents were invested in multiple funds over multiple periods, then whichever bias’ they 
presented, would carry a large weight on the total sample and potentially be an incorrect result. To test 
for this, the Pareto principle was again applied and it was found that 66% of the respondents made up 
80% of the data points. Upon further visual testing, the data points appeared to be randomly distributed 
and it was therefore determined to be appropriate to test the data points going forward (Appendix 3).  
An inspection of the data was done to determine if there were any invalid responses or outliers.  Invalid 
responses were those responses where participants had written words or a sentence not relating to a 
numerical estimate, such as: “I’m not sure but bad” as their estimate of the fund’s return. Such invalid 
responses were excluded from analysis. All the valid responses were inspected to ensure that they were 
in the correct format to perform statistical tests on. 
Upon inspection of the estimates of fund returns, one anomaly was noted. One participant had stated 
estimates ranging from 110% to 300% returns over the required period. These returns were significantly 
higher than any other estimates and appeared to be cumulative returns (not annualised returns). Owing 
to the uncertainty regarding this investors estimation, this participant was excluded from any analysis. 
Of the 81 participants that indicated having an investment in equity only units trusts, 39 participants did 
not provide any estimates for the funds that they indicated they were invested in or gave responses that 
could not be analysed and one investor provided cumulative returns, rather than annual returns. 
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Therefore, 40 investors were excluded from the 81 participants, resulting in only 41 respondents available 
to be analysed. 
The results of the survey will also be analysed to determine if there is any evidence of anchoring, as was 
found to be the case by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Barberis and Thaler (2003), as it has been 
described as one of the original three decision-making heuristics (Kahneman et al., 1982). The design of 
the survey was such that analyses of these biases were possible. 
Research Process 
In order to determine if the above research questions are true or not they needed to be statistically tested. 
The statistical tests used were dependant on the type of data that was collected during the surveying 
process.  
The following tests were used for each of the research questions and are discussed in more depth in the 
results chapter.  
1. Wilcoxon sign test  
2. Spearman rank correlation test 
3. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum test 
Ethics 
As people were involved in the research it was necessary to obtain ethical clearance from the University 
of Cape Town. This necessary process was followed and ethical clearance was duly given to go ahead with 
the research. All respondents to the survey agreed to participate in the survey as the first page of the 
questionnaire required all participants to agree to participate before being able to proceed. A brief 
synopsis of the research was presented on this first page and contact details were provided if there were 
any queries. Respondents were told that as participation was voluntary they could choose to withdraw 
from the survey at any point in time and their responses would not be recorded. The respondents were 
not of a vulnerable population as they were all employed and of the age of majority. There were certain 
demographic questions which could be deemed to be of a sensitive nature and for these questions a 
‘prefer not to answer’ answer was provided for those respondents who felt uncomfortable with the 
question. Each additional university contacted required approval prior to the survey being sent to staff 
members. NMMU required a whole new ethics form to be completed and submitted while Stellenbosch 
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and NWU only required proof of the UCT approval in order to send out the survey. All ethical requests 
were adhered to and the appropriate clearance was obtained prior to the survey being sent out. 
Limitations and Risks 
A limitation to the study was the low expected response rate. This limitation would thus result in a small 
sample size. This risk was mitigated by approaching other universities in South Africa and not only the 
University of Cape Town. The total responses for the survey were 466 and of those responses, 81 were 
directly invested in equity only unit trusts. After removing the 40 responses, as explained in the research 
method above, there were a total of 41 investors and 407 data points to be analysed which was a sample 
size large enough for statistical analysis as determined by the University of Cape Town’s Statistical 
Sciences Department. 
Another limitation was the lack of an individualised accurate return being available for comparison for 
each individual investor. Due to investors withdrawing and investing money throughout the periods being 
surveyed there is the possibility of an individual investors’ returns differing from those of the fund. This 
difference in returns could lead to less statistically significant variances in actual performance but it could 
also be the case that they lead to more statistically significant results. However, it was stated by Tippett 
(1994) that money weighted and time weighted returns are actually not significantly different over a 
‘short enough’ time interval (less than 10 years) and thus the fact that the investors actual results were 
not the same as the funds did not matter. Additionally, Willows (2012)  showed that 90% of investors 
invested in unit trusts over the five year period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2011 made no lump 
sum contributions, withdrawals or transfers into or out of the fund. However, Willows (2012)’s sample 






The three research questions stated above were each looked at and analysed separately during testing. A 
broad overview of the data obtained is discussed and presented below. 
The minimum estimate obtained from participants was ‘0’ and the maximum estimate was 150%. It was 
noted that no investor estimated a negative return over any of the investment periods under question 
and the reason for this could warrant further investigation. This, however, is beyond the scope of this 
study. The median for the estimated and adjusted estimate fund return were also calculated and can be 
seen in table 1 below. 
The reason for the difference between the number of estimates (407) and adjusted estimates (198) in 
table 1 below is that certain respondents did not indicate an adjusted return for the periods that they had 
provided initial returns for. Applying the Pareto principle it was determined that 80% of the adjusted 
estimates lay with 48.8% of the investors and it was thus determined appropriate to continue testing the 
population of adjusted estimates. Appendix 5 shows the distribution of the adjusted estimates supplied 
by respondents. 
Table 1: Summary of data 
Variable N Min Median Max 
Estimate 407 0% 5% 150% 
Actual Fund 
Return 
407 -4% 17% 58% 
Adjusted estimate 
of return after 
anchor 
introduced. 
198 0% 15% 38% 
 
Appendix 4 shows the composition of the 41 respondents whose data points were included in the testing 
performed.  
1.1 Do investors overestimate their returns? 
Upon analysis of the data obtained from the online survey, it was determined that the data was non-
normally distributed (Appendix 4). The data collected was a distribution of investors estimates of their 
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fund returns. As a result of the non-normal distribution of estimates, the Wilcoxon sign test was used to 
test for overconfidence among investors’ estimates of their returns. This Wilcoxon sign test is a non-
parametric version of the paired samples t-test. In a paired samples t-test the assumption is that the data 
is normally distributed and so testing can be done by looking at the estimate versus the fund return using 
the assumption of normality. However, as the data is non-normally distributed, the t-test would not 
suffice and thus the Wilcoxon sign test was used to test the difference between the fund return and the 
investors estimate of their return. The reason that the test is a paired test is due to the fact that the 
estimate made by the investor is ‘paired’ to the actual return earned by the same fund (as calculated from 
the fund fact sheet), for analysis. 
Both a two-sided and one-sided test was performed. The two-sided test was used to determine if there 
was either over or under estimation compared to the fund return. The one-sided test was then performed 
to determine if the significant difference, identified in the two-sided test, was an over or under estimation. 
Thus, where no statistically significant difference was found between the initial estimate and the fund 
return, no one-sided test was required to be performed. 
Table 2: Testing for Overconfidence 
 Wilcoxon Sign Test 
Two Sided alternate 
hypothesis 
p-value One-sided Null Hypothesis p-value 
Estimate vs. Actual Fund 
Return 
1 <0.001 2 1.000 
 
1. For the two-sided test, the following hypothesis was tested: 
  Ho: Median of Estimate - Fund returns = 0 vs. 
  Ha: Median of Estimate - Fund returns not equal to 0 
 
2. For the one-sided test, the following hypothesis was tested: 
 Ho: median of Estimate - Fund returns ≥ 0 vs.  
 Ha: median of Estimate - Fund returns < 0 
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The p-value of the two-sided test is significant at the 5% level, showing a difference in the medians of the 
estimated and the actual fund returns. The p-value of the one-sided test is not significant, indicating that 
investors are underestimating their fund returns rather than overestimating them, as was shown by Glaser 
& Weber (2007).  
A possible explanation for this result might be the financial crisis of 2008 (Appendix 1) being fresh in 
investors minds. This might lead investors to think that the returns they have earned are less than what 
they have actually achieved. The reason for this result is beyond the scope of this research, but is an area 
for future research. 
1.2 Gender Testing 
Further testing the under confidence identified in the testing done in hypothesis 2 above, the respondents 
were split by gender to test if one gender was making statistically significantly higher or lower estimates 
than the other gender. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was done on the respondents based on gender. 
The test is a two-sample test due to the fact that there are can only be two possible answers, i.e. male or 
female. A rank sum, which is the summation of all the observations for that gender, was generated and 
compared against the expected rank sum to determine if the sum is statistically significant. Based on the 
rank sums from the analysis there was a statistically significant difference and the results are presented 
in table 3 below: 
Table 3: Gender Testing 
 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (Mann-Whitney) 
Observation Rank Sum Expected p-value 
Female 14 26410 31302 <0.001 
Male 27 62843 57951 - 
Combined 41 89253 89253  
 
Key: 
• Observation: Number of respondents 
• Rank Sum: Sum of all data points 
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• Expected: Expected sum given split between male and female 
• P-value: significance of difference between rank sum and expected 
The p-value is significant at the 5% level reflecting statistically significant differences between estimates 
made by males and females. This is reflected by the p-value of less than 0.001. Only one test is required 
to be run as showing a difference between females and males will return the same result if tested between 
males and females. The rank sum totals reflects males having higher estimates than females. This is in 
agreement with Bengtsson et al. (2005); Bhandari and Deaves (2006); Estes and Hossseini (2001); 
Furnham (2001); Gysler et al. (2002); Jones and Tullous (2002); Powell and Ansic (1997); Rammstedt and 
Rammsayer (2002) and Subrahmanyam (2008) who all noted overconfidence among male investors. 
However, as the sample as a whole was underestimating their return; the finding that males had 
higher estimates than females might indicate that they were estimating their past returns more 
accurately. This could be due to the fact that women have stronger negative recall bias (Beyer, 1998), 
resulting in female’s estimates being more heavily affected by the negative perception of the financial 
crisis of 2008 than their male counterparts. 
2. Does experience (with age as a proxy) influence the degree of overestimations? 
Despite the results of the first research question showing an underestimation by investors, it would still 
be useful in determining whether experience (with age as a proxy (Greenwood and Nagel, 2009)) perhaps 
minimises this underestimation or worsens it.  
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was performed by ranking the age of investors and correlating them 
against their estimated returns to determine if there was any relationship. A p-value of <0.001 was 
determined (Table 4 below) from the tests performed. 
Table 4: Age Testing 




This is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and indicates that there is a correlation between 
the two variables. The correlation found was 0.217 which is positive but weak. This showed that as 
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investors become older they underestimate their results less which infers that older investors might be 
better at estimating actual returns. This result was is in agreement with Goetzmann, W. N. & Zhu, N. 
(2002). The fact that returns are more accurate could be due to better awareness of market conditions or 
less bias towards recent results as they have experienced such market crashes in the past. It could also be 
due to more wisdom gained from following the stock market or their investments for a longer period of 
time. 
3. Are investors estimations influenced by anchors? 
The data obtained from the survey included the original estimate of the fund return as well as the adjusted 
estimates once the JSE all share return was presented for the same period. The difference between the 
original and adjusted estimates was needed in order to determine if investors are influenced by an anchor. 
A two sided test was required to determine if investors adjust their estimates of returns when presented 
with an anchor (the JSE all share returns). A two sided test was used as the data first needed to be tested 
to determine if there was any statistically significant movement, either adjusting higher or lower. If there 
was a movement, then the direction of this movement needed to be determined. 
Table 5: Testing for Anchoring 
 Wilcoxon Sign Test 
Two Sided alternate 
hypothesis 
p-value One-sided Null Hypothesis p-value 
Estimate vs. Adjusted 
estimate 
3 0.319 - - 
 
3. Two-sided test:  
Ho: median of Estimate - Adjusted Estimate = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of Estimate - Adjusted Estimate ≠ 0 
The p-value of 0.319, from table 5, in the two sided test is not significant, thus there is no evidence of a 
statistical difference between the estimates and adjusted estimates in either direction. Many of the 
respondents provided the same returns for their adjusted estimates as they had for their initial estimate 
even though their initial estimate was different to the JSE all share return. There is the possibility that the 
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anchor was too high compared to respondents’ initial estimates, thus they didn’t think that it could be 
possible for their fund to have earned a return as high as the JSE return. There is the additional possibility 
that respondents did not know that the JSE all share return was the benchmark for their fund, thus when 





Men were found to have higher estimates of their past returns than their female counterparts which is in 
agreement with literature by Subrahmanyam (2008), among other noted previously. However, as the 
statistical testing had identified that the entire population was underestimating rather than 
overestimating their past returns, as was the case with Glaser & Weber (2007), it was determined that 
men were in fact making better estimates of their past returns due to the fact that they had higher 
estimates. It was proposed that a possible reason for this was due to women having a stronger negative 
recall bias as shown by Beyer (1998). The financial crisis of 2008 and the negative market returns 
experienced during this period may have been a stronger factor in females’ estimates than in males’ 
estimates. When analysing the results in aggregate it was found that there were three times as many 
negative variances between initial estimates and actual fund returns than positive variances. 
Once the under confidence had been analysed; tests were performed to determine if there was any 
evidence that age, as a proxy for experience, decreased the level of any behavioural bias. As under 
confidence, rather than overconfidence, had been identified, an increase in estimates as respondent’s 
ages increased would show that under confidence decreased as age increased. A positive correlation was 
found, thus indicating that with age, investors are less prone to behavioural biases as was shown by 
Goetzmann, W. N. & Zhu, N. (2002). 
There was no evidence of anchoring found on the adjusted estimates obtained from investors. This could 
be due to the fact that respondents did not know that their funds were tracking the JSE all share return 
as a benchmark. Additionally, the fact that so many investors had underestimated their returns may mean 
that the JSE all share return was much higher than their estimate and thus they didn’t adjust their estimate 
as the jump was too big. Kahneman et al. (1982) found evidence of anchoring in their testing and Englich 
et al. (2006) showed that anchoring existed even among experts. The finding in this study is thus contrary 
to this literature and further investigation of this finding is warranted. However, such investigation is 
outside the scope of this paper.  
Improvements and areas for further research 
Some of the respondents in the survey were not sure if they were invested in unit trusts or what the name 
of the unit trust was. If permission could be obtained from investment houses to send out a survey directly 
to their investors, this would take out the uncertainty and provide more accurate data for analysis.  It 
would also enable the analysis of overconfidence between investment houses and thus the potential to 
40 
 
determine if a certain fund attracts more overconfident investors than other funds. Furthermore, if 
investment houses approved thereof, it would enable access to accurate historical returns that could be 
used to analyse the estimates of each specific individual. 
Obtaining the involvement of investment houses could also assist in increasing the response rate to avoid 
having to test data points, as opposed to individual investors, to allow for a testable sample size. Further 
methods to enable a larger response such as different types of incentivisation could also be investigated.  
Only academics were surveyed in this study and thus by looking at an entire population representative of 
all investors it would be possible to further analyse overconfidence depending on their particular 
profession/occupation. 
It was noted that investors never estimated negative nominal returns for any fund for any length of time. 
As noted earlier, the return for the Investec Value Fund for the 12 months ended 30 June 2013 was 
negative. It was shown that the respondents in total displayed underestimation, however this was not the 
case for negative returns. The number of returns estimated on the Investec Value Fund over this period 
(one) showed there was in fact overconfidence and this warrants further investigation. Further work could 
also be performed to predict if any behavioural biases dissuade an investor from estimating a negative 
return. 
The findings that investors underestimate their return and are not influenced by anchors is contrary to 
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3. Distribution of data points per individual 
 





















Number of data points per individual
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4. Distribution of estimate data points 
 
















































6. Female Data Points 
 







































8. Adjusted Estimates 
 
9. Qualtrics Survey 
 Not all demographic information was used in the testing for the purpose of this dissertation but was 
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